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THWARTING JUDICIAL POWER TO ORDER SUMMARY JURY
TRIALS IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT: STRANDELL V. JACKSON
COUNTY
Federal district court judges are increasingly using alter-
native dispute resolution techniques in an effort to reduce court
delay and clear congested dockets. One such technique is the
summary jury trial, a non-binding, abbreviated version of a
trial used to help litigants reach a settlement. One controversy
surrounding the summary jury trial is whether district court
judges may compel parties to participate in summary jury trial
proceedings. The Author examines a recent case to consider
this issue and concludes that federal district court judges are
authorized to order summary jury trials.
IN STRANDELL v. JACKSON COUNTY, plaintiff's counsel
was held in criminal contempt for disobeying a court order re-
quiring plaintiff to submit his case to a summary jury trial (SJT).2
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated the contempt judgment
and held that a district court does not have the authority to com-
pel participation in a non-binding SJT.3
Balancing the substantive rights of individuals against the le-
gitimate desire of the court to clear its docket and reduce delay,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and the court's inherent power to control its docket do not
permit the court to order a non-binding SJT against the wishes of
the litigants. The Seventh Circuit is the only court to so limit a
federal district court's ability to control its docket, a power that is
important to the trial process in reducing delay and facilitating
settlements.
This Note outlines the holding in Strandell, and offers rea-
sons to uphold judicial power to mandate SJTs.4 Part I discusses
1. 115 F.R.D. 333 (S.D. 11.), vacated, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987).
2. For a discussion explaining the SJT process, see infra notes 14-26 and accompany-
ing text.
3. Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987).
4. This Note does not reach the question of whether SJT or other forms of alternate
dispute resolution (ADR) violate the Constitution. For a discussion of the right to a jury
trial, due process and equal protection, see Levin and Golash, Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion in Federal District Courts, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 29, 45-48 (1985). Furthermore, be-
cause the issue was not raised in Strandell this Note does not consider whether judges have
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the benefits of the SJT, and the importance of judicial power and
discretion to effectuate settlements through the SJT. Part II re-
futes the Strandell analysis, and proposes different reasons for the
Strandell outcome. This Note concludes that the holding of
Strandell is wrong, and that district court judges are authorized
to order SJTs.
I. BACKGROUND
A. SJT: A Form of Court-Annexed Alternate Dispute
Resolution
Federal district court judges are becoming increasingly inno-
vative5 by using various forms of alternative dispute resolution
(ADR).6 ADR is encouraged by the amended Federal Rules of
the authority to empanel jurors for SJT pursuant to the Jury Selection and Service Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1866(a) (1982). For a persuasive argument against using summoned jurors for
SJT, see Hume v. M&C Management, No. C87-3104 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 15, 1990) (LExIS,
Genfed Library, Dist. File); see also Maatman, The Future of Summary Jury Trials in
Federal Courts: Strandell v. Jackson County, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455 (1988) (Ger-
ald Maatman, plaintiff's counsel in Strandell, discusses the arguments for and against em-
panelling jurors for SJTs); Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alter-
native Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 385-87
(1986) (questioning a judge's authority to empanel jurors for SJT pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c) and the Jury Selection and Service Act); Ruling Against
Use of Jurors in SJT Is 'Out of Sync,' Judge Lambros Says, 4 ADR REPORT 83-84 (argu-
ing that judges do have the power to empanel jurors for SJT).
5. This innovation has been lauded and encouraged by former Chief Justice Warren
Burger.
In his 1983 Year-End Report on the Judiciary . . . Chief Justice [Burger]
called upon the bar and the bench to actively seek alternatives to the high cost of
litigation and the ever increasing case overload problem, saying in part: 'Experi-
mentation with new methods in the judicial system is imperative given growing
case loads, delays, and increasing costs. Federal and state judges throughout the
country are trying new approaches to discovery, settlement negotiations, trial
and alternatives to trial that deserve commendation and support. The bar should
work with judges who are attempting to make practical improvements in the
judicial system. Greater efficiency and cost-effectiveness serve both clients and
the public. Legal educators and scholars can provide a valuable service by study-
ing new approaches and reporting on successful innovations that can serve as
models for other jurisdictions, and on experiments that do not survive the scru-
tiny of careful testing.
A. LEVIN, E. GREEN, J. ETHERIDGE, C. MENKEL-MEADOW & T. LAMBROS, DISPUTE RESo-
LUTION IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY: FINAL REPORT OF THE 1985 CHIEF JUSTICE EARL
WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES 118 (1985) [hereinafter
WARREN CONFERENCE].
6. No one form of ADR has prevailed among the judiciary.
[lI]ndividual approaches vary widely, and . . . the impact of many techniques
seems to depend both on the personal qualities a judge brings to the task and on
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Civil Procedure to reduce court delay and clear congested dock-
ets.7 The SJT is one of several ADR techniques being used by
district court judges.8
There are many types of ADR but most can be categorized
as either private or court-annexed.9 Private ADR may take the
form of mediation, private arbitration, or mini-trials. 10 Private
ADR is consensual and can be individualized by the parties to suit
their needs.
The overarching point [regarding private ADR procedures] is
that the parties can design processes that determine not only
who will host their negotiations, and what role he or she will
play, but also what kinds of information will be considered,
whether (or to what extent) the information will be subject to
the filtering of the rules of evidence, what the tone of the pro-
ceedings will be, in what order various elements of the program
will be placed, when the events shall occur, whether, for how
long, and for what purposes they shall be interrupted, and so
forth. In other words, the parties enjoy a level of freedom in
the local legal environment .... Success in promoting settlements thus depends
on a marriage of technique with personal and institutional resources, a dynamic
that tends to confound cross-court comparisons . . . . The unavoidable linkage
of judicial settlement initiates with personal and institutional capacities suggests
that judges must rely heavily on their own assessments in deciding how to en-
hance settlement possibilities.
D. Provine, Settlement Strategies For Federal District Court Judges 9-10 (1986).
7. "The 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure encourage
judges to take an active role in the settlement of civil suits . . . . These changes can be
interpreted both as an endorsement of what some judges were already doing and as a call
to future action." Id. at 8-9 (footnote omitted).
8. Since 1980, approximately 65 federal district courts have held SJTs. Maatman,
supra note 4, at 457. Chief Justice Burger has commended SJT as innovative and useful.
Id. at 457 n.12 (citing W. BURGER, 1984 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY 15-16).
9. For an overview of different types of ADR, see W. BRAZIL, EFFECTIVE AP-
PROACHES TO SETTLEMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES 15-82 (1988); S.
GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 3-309 (1985) [hereinafter S.
GOLDBERG]; Levin and Golash, supra note 4, at 32-42; Sander, Alternative Methods of
Dispute Resolution: An Overview, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1985).
10. This list of private ADR techniques is not exhaustive. For more complete de-
scriptions of private ADR techniques, see sources cited supra note 9.
SJT is often confused with privately conducted mini-trials. In a mini-trial, after agree-
ing to the process, the parties usually choose a neutral advisor to accept briefs and exhibits,
and manage the procedure. Advocates for each party conduct limited discovery and present
their case at the mini-trial which lasts one to two days. The tone of the mini-trial is less
like a trial and more like a business meeting. After the mini-trial, the parties will hopefully
participate in negotiations, which can last several weeks, to settle the matter. Mini-trials
have been used primarily in the business world, and they "are not designed to provide
accurate trial forecasts," as opposed to SJT. Lambros, The Judge's Role in Fostering Vol-
untary Settlements, 29 VILL L. REV. 1363, 1365 n.11 (1984).
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shaping processes to fit their situation that is without parallel in
formal, public adjudication.1
Court-annexed ADR can be as flexible as private ADR, but
it is ordered and/or conducted by the trial judge. 2 Examples of
court-annexed ADR include court-ordered arbitration, neutral ex-
perts, fact finders, special masters, and SJTs.13
SJT is a court-annexed abbreviated version of a trial that is
used to help litigants reach a settlement. Although SJT proce-
dures vary,' 4 a conference is usually held before the SJT to dis-
cuss the rules and submit motions, witness lists, proposed jury in-
structions and voir dire questions.
On the day of the SJT, a jury is selected from the regular
jury pool, and the attorneys summarize and present their argu-
ments to the jury. Usually counsel may only present evidence that
would be admissible at trial pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, and may not call witnesses but can read from depositions.
Counsel are usually given an opportunity to rebut opposing coun-
sel's presentation and also may give a closing argument. A SJT
typically lasts one or two days.
After the trial, the jury is asked to return a unanimous ver-
dict, which is not binding on the parties. Individual verdicts are
acceptable when unanimity is impossible. The court requests that
the jury answer interrogatories, which help counsel to pinpoint
specific weaknesses in their cases. In addition, counsel are some-
times permitted to question the jury directly, after the verdict is
returned, for the purpose of better understanding the strengths
and weaknesses of their cases. The verdict, interrogatories, and
questioning session help counsel predict the possibility of success
1I. W. BRAZIL, supra note 9, at 16.
12. Judge Lambros refers to these alternatives as "judicially-managed." Lambros,
supra note 10, at 1365. One commentator says modification of the adversary system
through court-annexed ADR is the wave of the future. "The likeliest prospect is that the
adversary process will be modified, even in court settings, where judicial management is
increasing rapidly and shunting devices [like SJT] that impose conditional decisions or
promote settlements are also used increasingly." Rosenberg, Resolving Disputes Differ-
ently: Adieu to Adversary Justice?, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 801, 822 (1988).
13. This list is not exhaustive. For more complete descriptions of court-annexed
ADR, see sources cited supra note 9. This Note focuses on SJT as a court-annexed ADR
procedure. Some of the analysis, though, may be applicable to other court-annexed or even
private ADR procedures.
14. For example, SJT may be conducted by a judge or a magistrate. Lambros, supra
note 10, at 1376. For other procedural descriptions of SJT, see Lambros, supra note 10, at
1373-78; Lambros & Shunk, The Summary Jury Trial, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 43 (1980);
Spiegel, Summary Jury Trials, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 829 (1986).
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or failure at trial, which serves as an impetus to settle. If the par-
ties do not negotiate a settlement on their own, the judge may call
a settlement conference or schedule an immediate trial date.
The following cases illustrate the flexibility of the SJT where
the SJT procedure was modified to meet specific needs of the par-
ties and the court. In November 1987, Judge S. Arthur Spiegel15
departed from the standard SJT procedure using a two week SJT
to settle a complex case16 brought by three utility companies
against General Electric for selling a defective nuclear reactor.17
An eight member jury deliberated for a little over two days and
returned a unanimous verdict for General Electric.' 8 Two months
later, the parties settled the case with Judge Spiegel's assistance,
and avoided the estimated four or five-month trial. 19
In another recent case, Judge Richard A. Enslen20 conducted
a SJT at the request of the parties in a complex ground-water
toxic tort case.21 The case involved 29 plaintiffs, and the issue of
causation was anticipated to lead to testimony by 80 expert wit-
nesses. 2 A jury of ten was selected and heard the case, but later
was split into two separate groups of five to deliberate. 23 After a
three day SJT, one jury returned a $2.8 million verdict for the
plaintiffs and the other jury returned a verdict for the defendant.2 4
The jurors were questioned after returning their verdicts, in order
for counsel to obtain insight about the case. The uncertainty of
how a real jury would resolve the case (or the risk of losing) com-
pounded by the high costs of further litigation prompted settle-
ment negotiations. 25 The case was settled with Judge Enslen's as-
15. United States District Judge, Southern District of Ohio, Western Division.
16. One commentator warns against using SJT in complex cases because the evi-
dence may not be effectively summarized for the jury. W. BRAZIL, supra note 9, at 70.
17. The SJT was conducted in Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 117
F.R.D. 597 (S.D. Ohio 1987), afid, 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988); see GE, Utilities End
SIB Case With Summary Jury Trial, 6 ALTERNATIVES To THE HIGH COST OF LITIGA-
TION, Feb. 1988, No. 2, at 17, 22 [hereinafter Utilities].
18. Utilities, supra note 17, at 22.
19. Id. at 17.
20. United States District Judge, Western District of Michigan.
21. An SJT With Two Juries Helps in Resolving Major Mich. Water-Contamina-
tion Dispute, 6 ALTERNATIVES To THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION, Feb. 1988, No. 2, at
19 [hereinafter SJT With Two Juries].
22. Id.
23. Id. at 20.
24. Id.
25. Id. Judge Lambros explained the considerations that prompt settlement negotia-
tions: "[Tihe decision [to settle] is a voluntary one, based on the disputants' balancing of a
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sistance early the following morning, thus avoiding an estimated
nine to fourteen month trial. 6 These cases illustrate the utility,
versatility, and success of the SJT which sets the stage for this
Note's discussion.
B. The Pros and Cons of Summary Jury Trials
There is no panacea for alternative dispute resolution. 7 SJT
is not the best, nor the only, form of ADR for every situation.2
Judge Thomas Lambros2" observed:
Summary Jury Trial is but one of a variety of alternative dis-
pute resolution processes in use today. Each has its own particu-
lar merit, . . . [t]he processes are not in competition with each
other. They simply serve varying needs based on particular cir-
cumstances and the particular place any one case finds itself on
the time line toward resolution. Summary Jury Trial is a final
alternative before full trial."0
The use of SJT has met with overwhelming approval. In Sep-
tember 1984, SJT was endorsed by the Judicial Conference of the
United States to be used as an experimental settlement tech-
wide variety of factors, including cost, time, and uncertainty of results." Lambros, supra
note 10, at 1367.
26. SJT With Two Juries, supra note 21, at 19.
27. "[T]here is no single technique that is best for every judge, for every case. There
is no panacea; there is no universal solvent." WARREN CONFERENCE, supra note 5, at 3.
28. In Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir.
1988), the court affirmed that there is no First Amendment right of access or public right
to know of SJT proceedings and stated:
[W]hile the summary jury trial is a highly reliable predictor of the likely trial
outcome, there are manifold differences between it and a real trial.
At every turn the summary jury trial is designed to facilitate pretrial settle-
ment of the litigation, much like a settlement conference.
The summary jury trial can play a particularly useful role in facilitating the
settlement of complex cases and is typically employed in cases that either will
consume significant judicial resources if they proceed to trial, or that are not
amendable to settlement through other techniques.
Id. at 904.
29. United States District Judge, Northern District of Ohio. Judge Lambros created
the SJT in 1980. S. GOLDBERG, supra note 9, at 283.
30. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute
Resolution, A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States, 103 F.R.D. 461,
463 (1984). "[S]ummary jury trial work[s] well in settling cases that might have gone on
to full trial had they not been assigned to such a procedure." M. JACOUBOVITCH & C.
MOORE, SUMMARY JURY TRIALS IN THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 7 (1982).
[Vol. 40:491
1989-90] POWER TO ORDER SUMMARY JURY TRIALS 497
nique.3 Most lawyers who have participated in SJT indicate that
they would like to do it again.32
Although the success of the SJT is difficult to measure,33 it is
reported that thirty to forty percent of the cases set for SJT settle
before it occurs.34 Most cases that go through SJT settle before
trial, and only a few go through a trial on the merits. 35 Judge
Lambros reports a ninety percent settlement rate,36 and of the
fifty cases Judge Enslen has submitted to SJT, only three have not
settled. 37 Even if SJT does not induce a settlement, advocates say
31. WARREN CONFERENCE, supra note 5, at 43; S. GOLDBERG, supra note 9, at 283.
The Conference resolution is set forth below:
RESOLUTION
Whereas trial by jury is the cornerstone of the American system of justice;
Whereas the use of court-annexed alternative methods of dispute resolution
in appropriate cases may facilitate the voluntary settlement of cases before trial;
and
Whereas each case is unique and can only be settled fairly if the settlement
devices used to foster its resolution are tailored to its particular characteristics:
Now therefore it is RESOLVED:
That courts should employ alternative methods of dispute resolution as cat-
alysts to settlement, but that these alternatives should in no way impair the liti-
gants' ultimate rights to a full trial;
That studies should be conducted concerning the effectiveness of alternative
methods of dispute resolution in comparison with traditional procedures;
That a comprehensive system of alternative methods of dispute resolution
should be integrated into the existing judicial framework; and
That the use of alternative dispute resolution in the courts be conducted
consistent with the traditions of public accountability, access, and privacy em-
bedded in our judicial system.
WARREN CONFERENCE, supra note 5, at 119-20.
32. D. PROVINE, supra note 6, at 75. These lawyers also report that they would like
to have a say in whether or not a case goes to SJT. Id. "[T]he attorney who objected to the
first summary jury trial he was required to participate in is now the biggest local fan of the
procedure." McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 49 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (comment by
Judge Bertlesman).
33. See Posner, supra note 4, at 388-89.
34. D. PROVINE, supra note 6, at 75. United States District Judge Bertelsman of the
Eastern District of Kentucky said:
In my own experience summary jury trials have netted me a savings in time
of about 60 days and I have only used the procedure five times. It settled two of
these cases that were set for 30-day trials. It is true that I cannot prove scientifi-
cally that the cases would not have settled anyway but my experience tells me
they would not. I do know that but for my making summary jury trials
mandatory in these cases, they would not have occurred.
McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 49 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, "[i]f the procedure is ineffec-
tive and wastes time, we may expect it to be abandoned, since most federal trial judges are
not profligate of their time." Id.
35. D. PROVINE, supra note 6, at 75-76.
36. Lambros, supra note 10, at 1377.
37. Maatman and Gilbert, Summary Jury Trial: The Long & Short of It, CH. B. A.
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there are advantages to it such as "better prepared lawyers and
enhanced judicial familiarity with the case, which may allow the
judge to expedite the trial."38
Arguably a higher degree of judicial involvement will strike
fear in the hearts of lawyers because of pressure or "pollution"
from the trial judge.39 Lawyers may believe "[t]here is a risk that
by participating in settlement negotiatiofis the judge will acquire
contaminating information that either makes it difficult . . . to
preside impartially at trial or that causes the parties to believe
that [the judge] could not preside impartially at trial." 0 Empiri-
cal evidence shows that lawyers' fear of judicial taint due to a
settlement conference is not as great in cases that will be heard by
a jury instead of a judge.41 Because cases heard at a SJT are jury
cases, arguably lawyers will fear judicial involvement in a SJT
less than in a settlement conference regarding a nonjury case.
Most important though, while the fear of judicial taint is ubiqui-
tous, there is no empirical data that measures the size or even
confirms the reality of these potential problems.42
There are benefits from close judicial involvement, such as
the judge's increased incentive to settle a case to clear his
docket,43 and the litigant's desire to put his best foot forward to
settle because the same judge probably will continue to be in-
volved in the case.44 Furthermore, statistics show that litigators
desire judicial involvement in the settlement process, particularly
because they feel that judges increase the likelihood of settle-
ment.45 High percentages of attorneys also feel that: (1) judges
REc. 18, 19 (April 1988).
38. D. PROVINE, supra note 6, at 75; see also Arabian American Oil Co. v. Scarfone,
119 F.R.D. 448, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1988) ("[lIlt is an embarassing professional exercise
before the court and jury to see lawyers floundering in their presentations due to inade-
quate preparation . . . . [A] summary jury trial forces [adequate] preparation.").
39. W. BRAZIL, supra note 9, at 104. Brazil addresses fear from judicial pressure in
the context of judicially hosted settlement conferences, but this fear is also likely to arise in
SJTs because both settlement conferences and SJTs increase judicial involvement.
40. Id. at 106.
41. Id. at 105.
42. Id. at 106.
43. Id. at 107.
44. Id. at 108.
45. Id. at 392. The data, part of an American Bar Association (A.B.A.) survey, indi-
cates that 92 percent of the lawyers in a sample group for Northern California agreed that
judicial involvement significantly improves the prospect of settlement. 75 percent of the
lawyers in a sample group from Northern Florida, who are the most conservative about
judicial involvement, also agreed with this proposition. Id. at 392-93.
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should "try to facilitate settlement in cases where they have not
been asked to do so;" 46 (2) "a settlement conference hosted by a
judge [should] be mandatory in most cases in federal court; ' 4
and (3) judges should take a more active role in settlement. 48
Judge Lambros believes judicial involvement is essential to the de-
velopment of ADR:
Because of [the] enduring public confidence in the judiciary,
judges must play a central role in the development and imple-
mentation of effective alternative means of dispute resolution. If
judges play an effective role in the development of alternatives
to the traditional jury trial, they can aid in the efficient resolu-
tion of disputes without impairing the ability of courts to provide
their traditional services."
There are advantages to SJT compared to other ADR proce-
dures.5 0 SJT is helpful to attorneys because it provides a formal
forum for hearing a case"1 that forces them to fully prepare the
case and examine its true worth and viability. This well-informed
evaluation encourages settlement discussions. 2
In cases where the client is preventing settlement, 53 a
[s]ummary jury trial . . . is a powerful tool for disabusing cli-
ents of um ealistic notions about their chances of success and for
providing emotional clients a forum to vent their feelings. The
primary obstacle to settlement these procedures are designed to
46. Id. at 394-96. 70 percent of lawyers polled by the A.B.A. wanted judges to
"push" for settlement, but only 57 percent of judges actually did so. Id. at 394.
47. Id. at 394-96.
48. Id. at 398-99. 73 percent of litigators polled would "prefer a-settlement judge
who actively offers suggestions and observations" to "one who simply facilitates communi-
cation between the parties." Id.
49. Lambros, supra note 10, at 1367-68.
50. Privacy is an attractive quality of many ADR techniques, and SJT may provide
as much privacy as any other ADR procedure. For example, the Sixth Circuit recently
affirmed a decision barring public access to SJT proceedings. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co.
v. General Elec. Co., 117 F.R.D. 597 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd, 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir.
1988).
5I. SJT resembles a trial on the merits more closely than other forms of ADR. This
is helpful because lawyers' "training has schooled them to believe first, last and always in
litigation and the adversary process. They think real advocates don't give ground when
their client has a just cause; and that covers almost all cases, and both sides of them."
Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 816. In other words, perhaps SIT satisfies the adversarial
urge of lawyers, so they can move on to discuss settlement.
52. D. PROVINE, supra note 6, at 16.
53. "Frequently each side regards it as a betrayal of the righteousness of its position
to do anything but litigate to the finish. Some clients would rather go down in flames after
trial than settle without one." Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 816.
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remedy is lack of information upon which to make an evaluation
of the case. 4
SJT also satisfies the litigant's urge to have his day in court.55
Participation of the client has long been recognized as essential to
the settlement process. 56
Furthermore, SJT and other court-annexed alternatives "pre-
serve access to the courts and at the same time avoid both the
constitutional and the policy level objections that the [private] al-
ternatives provoke if they are made compulsory and exclusive of
the courts."'57 The objection to mandatory private alternatives is
that at best they violate society's strong commitment to permitting
access to the courts and at worst they may deny litigants their
constitutional right to a jury trial, while mandatory court-annexed
procedures give litigants the option of returning to court if they
are unable to settle.58
The benefits of SJT over a pretrial settlement conference are
similar to the benefits of SJT over other ADR procedures. 59 The
formality of the procedure forces litigants to fully prepare. For
example, in a settlement conference, parties may not accurately
specify the worth of their case, either because the parties don't
know its worth or because they unrealistically estimate the actual
amount.60 SJT forces litigants to know the worth of their case
54. D. PROVINE, supra note 6, at 86; see McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43,
50 (E.D. Ky. 1988); W. BRAZIL, supra note 9, at 68-69.
55. As one commentator has explained it:
Proponents [of the adversary system] argue that the opportunity to play an ac-
tive role in the proceedings that decide their rights satisfies people's deep-seated
desire to have their day in court. They point to empirical evidence showing that
both litigants and non-litigants are better satisfied with the process and the out-
come if they have significantly participated in the case in the way the adversary
process allows.
Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 812 (footnote omitted); see McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 50.
56. "Participation in settlement negotiations sensitizes clients to ... problems, pro-
vides an opportunity for catharsis, and encourages clients to impose 'economic discipline'
on their lawyers. The presence of clients at a settlement proceeding also helps ensure better
preparation by counsel." D. PROVINE, supra note 4, at 16 (footnote omitted).
57. Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 817.
58. Id. at 816-17.
59. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text (regarding the benefits of SJT
over other ADR procedures).
60. See D. PROVINE, supra note 6, at 26.
[Jlt is not so easy for the parties to assess the strengths and weaknesses of their
case or the value of the claims, and often the lack of this kind of information
makes meaningful settlement conferences impossible.
The Courts, out of concern that the barriers to settlement of complex cases
[Vol. 40:491
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with specificity and present it to a jury with no more inflation than
would occur during a trial on the merits. Ultimately, SJT provides
more impetus to settle than other pretrial procedures, because
scheduling SJT provides impetus similar to scheduling a trial.6'
Scheduling a date for trial has long been viewed as one of the
most effective techniques for promoting settlements.6 2
Keep in mind that SJT is a last resort, saved for cases where
other settlement procedures have failed,63 and which will take
more than a few days to try. 4 Even then, there are situations
where SJT is inappropriate, such as in cases against the govern-
ment,615 in cases likely to set precedent,66 where the credibility of a
witness is a critical issue,6 7 or where counsel is inexperienced or
result in great costs to the legal system because a case like this can go on for
months on end - other litigants are at the courthouse door and want their cases
tried and their cases get backed up which causes problems for everyone - have
devised a range of settlement techniques to assist the parties in resolving dis-
putes without going to trial, if at all possible.
Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 117 F.R.D. 597, 604 (S.D. Ohio 1987),
aft'd, 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added).
61. M. JACOUBOVITCH & C. MOORE, supra note 30, at 31.
62. D. PROVINE, supra note 6, at v.
63. W. BRAZIL, supra note 9, at 68; see supra text accompanying note 30.
64. "Most participants [at the Federal Judicial Center's 1985 Conference on the Ju-
dicial Role in Settlement] agreed . . . that summary jury trial should be reserved for cases
that are likely to take more than a few days to try." D. PROVINE, supra note 6, at 15
(footnote omitted).
65. M. JACOUBOVITCH & C. MOORE, supra note 30, at 3. It is unclear why SJT is
inappropriate in cases against the government. Perhaps because access to SJT can be
closed to the public, Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co v. General Elec. Co., 117 F.R.D. 597 (S.D.
Ohio 1987), 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988); see supra notes 28 and 50, it would violate the
First Amendment right of public access to government proceedings. Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise II]; Press-Enterprise Co.
v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise I]; Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555 (1980); Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984);
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983).
66. M. JACOUBOVITCH & C. MOORE, supra note 30, at 3.
67. Id. Where credibility is essential to the case, summary jury members will not
hear directly from witnesses, and will be less capable of assessing witness credibility. But a
credibility issue should not always preclude the use of SJT. A solution may be to instruct
the jury on credibility, for example:
[l]n weighing the evidence relating to an anticipated witness, you should con-
sider his relationship to the plaintiff or to the defendant; his interest, if any, in
the outcome of the case; his opportunity to observe or acquire knowledge con-
cerning the facts about which he would have testified; and the extent to which
his testimony would have been supported or contradicted by other credible
evidence.
ANTITRUST LAW SECTION OF THE OHIO STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, SUMMARY JURY TRIAL
OF AN ANTITRUST/RICO CASE, (presented at the Twenty-First Annual Antitrust Institute,
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unprepared."
The primary courtroom controversy surrounding the SJT is
the extent of judicial power used to compel parties to participate
in them.69 Mandatory70 SJT is not appropriate in every situation,
but when SJT is appropriate, judicial power and discretion are
necessary to enforce it.71 Judges are in the best position to reduce
delay in the process and clear their dockets.72 This is particularly
true where there are few incentives for counsel to speed up the
judicial process. 73 Since court-annexed ADR is designed to deal
Cleveland, Ohio, December 4, 1987). United States Magistrate Wayne Brazil suggests
modifying the SJT by asking "the court for permission to have each key witness present in
narrative form his or her version of the facts." W. BRAZIL, supra note 9, at 67.
68. D. PROVINE, supra note 6, at 70. The success of mandatory settlement confer-
ences has always been vitally dependent on the seniority of the attorneys and the amount of
preparation. Church, The "Old and the New" Conventional Wisdom of Court Delay, 7
JUST. Sys. J. 395, 402 (1982). Experience and preparation are especially important in
mandatory summary jury trials because the jury reacts only to counsel, whereas in a trial
on the merits the jury also considers the testimony and credibility of several witnesses. W.
BRAZIL, supra note 9, at 66-67.
69. See Lambros, supra note 10, at 1370 ("Today, there are serious questions with
respect to the judge's participation in the pretrial mechanism. A primary concern is
whether the judge has sufficient power and resources to keep from being overwhelmed by
the backlog of cases.").
70. "Mandatory" refers to SJT being mandatory upon a judge's order, not
mandatory in every case. This was explained in the Warren Conference:
[lI]t is helpful to make a point concerning terminology, specifically about the use
of the term 'mandatory'. There is an inherent ambiguity in the word. Sometimes
we mean ... that the procedure ha[s] to be used in every case . . . .But
'mandatory' today . . . mean[s] something very different: the judges, after de-
termining that a particular technique . . . is appropriate, orders the parties to
use the procedure, which then becomes mandatory for that particular case. In
this sense many ADR techniques are mandatory, although not intended to be
used except in a relatively small number of cases.
WARREN CONFERENCE, supra note 5, at 9.
71. "There is no attempt to mandate alternatives in every case. There will, rather,
be a large degree of dependence on the discretion of the judge in determining what is
appropriate in individual cases." Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
72. "The trial judge ... is in a good position to assess the obstacle(s) present in a
particular case and to respond with a pretrial plan that will enhance settlement opportuni-
ties . . . . [B]y tailoring assistance, a judge can promote more and better settlements than
can be achieved though any other approach." D. PROVINE, supra note 6, at 13-14.
Empirical data shows that limited judicial participation in settlement is valuable to
reducing courtroom delay, but at some point it becomes counter-productive. See S. FLAN-
DERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS 37 (FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 1977). Consequently, because SJT places a
greater burden on the court than other forms of ADR, it should be used sparingly. D.
PROVINE, supra note 6, at 85.
73. Church, supra note 68, at 402. Church cites incentives for causing delay, such as
the attorneys' desire to receive interim billings and space their workloads, and the fact that
clients do not always push for a speedy resolution. Id. "Procrastination and the desire to
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with congested dockets, judges should have the power to enforce
it. 4 The Strandell decision though, undermines the power of dis-
trict court judges to reduce court delay by instituting ADR proce-
dures such as SJT.
II. CASE DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS
A. The Events Leading Up to Strandell
In Strandell v. Jackson County, 5 the plaintiffs' attorney filed
a report concerning the prospects of settlement prior to a pretrial
conference. Plaintiffs requested a $500,000 settlement, but de-
fendants would not discuss it. At the pretrial conference, the
plaintiffs rejected the court's suggestion to use a SJT, and filed a
motion to advance the case for trial.
After the close of discovery, the court denied defendants' mo-
tion to compel production of work product. 6 The defendants re-
quested production of witness statements obtained by plaintiffs
during discovery. Plaintiffs argued that defendants could have dis-
covered the information through normal discovery, but did not.
The district court held that defendants failed to prove "substantial
need" and "undue hardship," as required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(3), thereby denying production.7"
Seven months after the pretrial conference, the district court,
over plaintiff's objection, ordered a SJT.78 On the day of the SJT,
plaintiffs' counsel was held in criminal contempt for refusing to
participate. The court entered a $500 judgment of criminal con-
tempt against plaintiffs' counsel, and held that it had the power to
use delay to soften the other side [also] play a role." D. PROVINE, supra note 6, at 17.
74. "There is certainly no ambiguity in the relationship between judge power and the
pace of litigation .... Church, supra note 68, at 404. Delay is greatly affected by "weak
leadership and judicial vacillation." Ryan, Lipetz, Luskin & Neubauer, Analyzing Court
Delay-Reduction Programs: Why Do Some Succeed?, 65 JUDICATURE 58, 62 (1981).
75. 115 F.R.D. 333 (S.D. Ill.), vacated, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987) (The plaintiffs
filed a civil rights action against the county relating to the arrest, strip search, imprison-
ment, and suicide of their son, Michael Strandell.).
76. Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 885 (7th Cir. 1987).
77. Strandell v. Jackson County, 7 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 715, 718 (S.D. I11.
1987).
78. Sometimes ADR, or SJT specifically, is authorized by a local rule of the court.
In the absence of a local rule, the district court in Strandell referred to the procedure
outlined by Judge Thomas Lambros in The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative
Methods of Dispute Resolution, A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States,
103 F.R.D. 461 (1984).
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compel participation in a non-binding SJT. 9 The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals vacated the district court's holding that district
court judges have the authority to compel participation in non-
binding SJTs.
B. The Strandell Decision
In Strandell, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court
did not have the power under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16
to compel participation in SJT, and that mandated SJTs intrude
on pretrial discovery and the work product doctrine.80 First, the
court narrowly interpreted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16.
Even though Rule 16 refers to the possible use of extrajudicial
procedures"' or ADR, the court concluded that Rule 16 "was not
intended to require that an unwilling litigant be sidetracked from
the normal course of litigation."8 Further, the Advisory Commit-
tee did not intend that Rule 16 would "impose settlement negotia-
tions on unwilling litigants." '
The Strandell court looked to J.F. Edwards Constr. Co. v.
Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp.84 and Identiseal Corp. v.
Positive Identification Sys.85 in interpreting Rule 16. In J.F. Ed-
wards, the Seventh Circuit determined that Rule 16 did not give
district court judges the power to compel parties to stipulate to
facts.8" Similarly, in Identiseal, the Seventh Circuit found that
Rule 16 did not give district court judges the power to compel
79. Strandell, 115 F.R.D. at 334-36. The court reached its decision in part because
it was unable to promptly hear a five or six-week trial, the parties were "poles apart" from
a settlement, and they used SJT successfully in the past. The court was further persuaded
by the Resolution of the 1984 Judicial Conference of the United States, FED. R. Civ. P. 16,
and the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1988).
80. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887-88.
81. It has been argued that SJT is not extrajudicial because it "is conducted inside
the courtroom of a federal courthouse, before an Article III judge, and with jurors selected
from the court's master jury wheel who are paid from congressionally apportioned funds."
Maatman, supra note 4, at 478.
82. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887. "To the extent a federal judge interferes with a
party's determination of settlement techniques, a court exceeds the scope of its case man-
agement powers under Rule 16." Maatman, supra note 4, at 471.
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note. "Rule 16 . . .was not designed as
a means for clubbing the parties - or one of them - into an involuntary compromise."
Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887 (quoting Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985)).
84. 542 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1976).
85. 560 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1976).
86. J. F. Edwards Constr. Co., 542 F.2d at 1325.
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counsel to initiate discovery.8v Interpreting these cases, the
Strandell court concluded that Rule 16 likewise did not give dis-
trict courts coercive power to compel participation in summary
jury trials.88
Second, Strandell considered whether SJT intruded on pre-
trial discovery and the work product doctrine.89 The plaintiffs re-
ferred to SJT as a device to allow "one litigant to make unfair use
of his opponent's diligent preparation for trial" after the close of
discovery.90 "Hence, [according to the plaintiffs] a mandatory
summary jury trial necessarily destroys the basis upon which the
work-product doctrine rests, as it would be inconsistent with the
doctrine's role of promoting the adversary system by safeguarding
the fruits of an attorney's trial preparation from their
opponent." 9'
The plaintiffs in Strandell also maintained that a mandatory
SJT required them to adopt a trial strategy confined to conclusory
arguments in order to prevent the revelation of protected witness
statements, which the trial court denied to defendants in an ear-
lier motion to compel.92 If counsel were in fact forced to use a
different strategy during SJT than would be used at trial, it would
defeat the purpose of the SJT to determine the possible outcome
of a jury trial on the merits. 3
The Seventh Circuit opined that SJT upsets the balance be-
tween "pretrial disclosure and party confidentiality" 9 because it
requires "disclosure of information obtainable, if at all, through
the mandated discovery process." 9 5 The court stated that
mandatory SJT radically alters "the considered judgments con-
tained in Rule 26 and in the case law" regarding pretrial discov-
ery and the work product doctrine.98 The court concluded it was
87. Identiseal Corp., 560 F.2d at 302.
88. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888. Prior to Strandell, the Seventh Circuit also held that
Rule 16 did not permit district court judges to compel a case to be tried in front of a
magistrate. Adams v. Heckler, 794 F.2d 303, 307 (7th Cir. 1986); Geras v. Lafayette
Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1040-41 (7th Cir. 1984). It is of no consequence
that SJT is sometimes conducted by a magistrate because SJT is not a final determination
on the merits, but rather a non-binding settlement procedure.
89. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888.
90. Maatman, supra note 4, at 476.
91. Id. at 476-77 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
92. Id. at 475. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
93. Maatman, supra note 4, at 475-76.
94. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888.
95. Id.
96. Id.
1989-90]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the job of Congress and the Supreme Court to amend the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, if such "radical surgery" was required.97
C. The Response to Strandell
1. District Courts Have the Power to Order Mandatory
Summary Jury Trials
Four federal district courts have addressed the Strandell is-
.sue since it was decided, and all have held that district court
judges have the power to require participation in SJTs."8 In Mc-
Kay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., Judge Bertelsman upheld the validity of
a local rule that read: "A judge may, in his discretion, set any
civil case for summary jury trial or other alternative method of
dispute resolution."9' 9 However, the judge made it clear that his
holding applied even in the absence of the rule.100 Judge
Bertelsman urged the legal community not to "smother a promis-
ing infant in the cradle," and speculated that after an experimen-
tation period, uniform rules might be promulgated or attorneys
might agree to be bound by SJT verdicts.10'
District courts have the power to order mandatory SJT as a
matter of inherent power to control the docket, 02 and pursuant to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 0 3 Rule 1 provides that the
rules "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination of every action."'0 4 Courts use SJT in an effort
to give civil litigants a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of their claims. Litigants might otherwise be deprived of a timely
resolution of their dispute due to the overwhelming and overbur-
97. Id.
98. Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Century Bank, 695 F. Supp. 1343 (D.
Mass. 1988); Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603 (D. Minn.
1988); McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Arabian Am. Oil Co.
v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
99. McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 44. Judge Bertelsman indicated that his intent as the
drafter was to "afford trial judges full authority to employ" SJT and other forms of ADR.
Id. at 44 n.3.
100. Id. at 49.
101. Id. at 50-51. This would not be very unusual. For example, litigants often agree
to be bound by the results of arbitration and mini-trials.
102. Id. at 48; Arabian Am. Oil Co., 119 F.R.D. at 449; Carey-Canada, Inc., 123
F.R.D. at 604.
103. Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 605 (D. Minn.
1988); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 117 F.R.D. 567, 599 (S.D. Ohio
1987), afl-d, 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988).
104. See Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
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dening caseloads in many federal courts.1 05
District courts also have the power to order SJTs pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16.101 Rule 16(a) provides that
"[iln any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attor-
neys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear
before it for a conference or conferences before trial for such pur-
poses as (1) expediting the disposition of an action . . . and (5)
facilitating the settlement of the cause." In addition, Rule 16(c)
states:
The participants at any conference under this rule may consider
and take action with respect to . . (7) the possibility of settle-
ment or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute
. . . (10) the need for adopting special procedures for managing
potentially difficult or protracted actions . . . and (11) such
other matters as may aid the disposition of the action.
Even though SJT is not a typical pretrial proceeding, it is recog-
nized as a "conference" for purposes of Rule 16.107
J.F. Edwards and Identiseal, the cases relied upon by the
Strandell court, predate the 1983 Amendment to Rule 16.108
105. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. at 605.
106. Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Century Bank, 695 F. Supp. 1343,
1347 n.3 (D. Mass. 1988).
107. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 117 F.R.D. 567, 602 (S.D.
Ohio 1987), af'd, 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988). "[W]e consider the summary jury trial to
be a pretrial proceeding; we recognize that it is not a 'conference' in the traditional sense
.... The summary jury trial is the final settlement technique undertaken by the Court
before trial on the merits." Id. "Rule 16 calls these procedures conferences, but what is in
a name . . . . Whatever name the judge may give to these proceedings their purposes are
the same and are sanctioned by Rule 16." Arabian Am. Oil Co., 119 F.R.D. at 448.
108. The 1983 amendments were a response to four major criticisms.
First, conferences [were] often seen as a mere exchange of legalistic contentions
without any real analysis of the particular case. Second, the result frequently
[was] nothing but a formal agreement on the minutiae. Third, the conferences
[were] seen as unnecessary and time-consuming in cases that [would] be settled
before trial. Fourth, the meetings [were] ceremonial and ritualistic, having little
effect on the trial and being of minimal value ....
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 206 (1983) (empha-
sis added). Rule 16 was designed to eliminate surprise and promote settlement. 6A C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1522 (1971).
Pre-1983 cases do not support the Strandell interpretation of Rule 16. In Buffington v.
Wood, 351 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1965), the court compelled full discovery as a prerequisite to
an effective pretrial conference. In McCargo v. Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393, 397 (4th Cir.
1976), the court took a different view of what "compulsory" means in the context of Rule
16. "Wisely, Rule 16 is not compulsory. If the judge views the case as a simple one, he is
not compelled to spin the judicial wheels and may simply order the case calendared for
trial." Id. The Fourth Circuit held that Rule 16 does not compel the judge to conduct a
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[T]he 1983 amendment was necessary to "meet the challenge of
modern litigation." Empirical studies reveal, as the committee
explained, that "efficient disposition of cases by 'settlement or
trial' is more likely when a trial judge intervenes personally."
Although Rule 16 does not require settlement negotiations, it
does express a clear preference for encouragement and facilita-
tion of settlements."9
Additionally, "[t]he clear intention of the recent amendments to
the Federal Rules is to provide the court with the tools that are
required to manage their caseloads effectively and efficiently."' 10
Thus, the precedential value of J.F. Edwards and Identiseal must
be questioned in light of the 1983 amendments.
The 1983 amendment to Rule 16 "was designed to encourage
pretrial settlement discussions, it was not its purpose to 'impose
settlement negotiations on unwilling litigants.' " Mandatory
SJT is a settlement tool that is consistent with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the goal of settling cases effectively and
efficiently." 2 Mandatory SJT does not impose negotiations on the
parties, it just compels the use of a technique that might lead to
effective negotiations. Likewise, mandatory SJT does not require
the parties to settle a case.
Neither J.F. Edwards nor Identiseal involve a settlement pro-
cedure. Both cases involve coercive judicial power applied under
the guise of Rule 16 which bore a direct impact on the outcome of
the case. In contrast, mandatory SJT and other settlement proce-
dures contemplated under Rule 16 are nonbinding processes
aimed to aid a voluntary settlement of the dispute." 3
pretrial conference, though the parties are obligated to attend one.
109. Panola Land Buying Assoc. v. Clark, 844 F.2d 1506, 1519 (11th Cir. 1988)
(Clark, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee
note).
110. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 107 F.R.D. 275, 277 (W.D.
Wis. 1985), rev'd, 848 F.2d 1415 (7th Cir. 1988), vacated and reh'g granted en banc, No.
86-3118, (7th Cir. July 22, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, U.S. App. file), afftd, 871 F.2d
648 (7th Cir. 1989). The Seventh Circuit's first opinion held that the specific language of
Rule 16 gave district courts discretion to "order attorneys and unrepresented parties, but
not represented parties, to appear for settlement conferences." 848 F.2d at 1422. The sec-
ond opinion went further, and, in affirming the trial court, held that Rule 16 also empow-
ered courts to order represented parties to attend settlement conferences. 871 F.2d at 656.
111. Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting advisory committee
notes, 97 F.R.D. 205, 210 (1983)). The Kothe court held the district court did not have the
power to compel parties to settle a case. Id.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 15-26; infra note 114.
113. The court in Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec., 117 F.R.D. 597, 602
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Requiring attorneys, and in some cases clients, to attend set-
tlement conferences pursuant to Rule 16 is becoming common-
place, 1 4 and, arguably, a mandatory SJT is no more coercive than
a mandatory settlement conference. 115 SJT probably is more ex-
pensive, and therefore in some respect is more coercive than a set-
tlement conference. However, judges use SJT as a last resort tech-
nique, after less expensive techniques have failed." 6 Furthermore,
the fact that judges order SJT on the eve of a full trial on the
merits for which the parties have diligently prepared"17 does not
mean that counsel's work is wasted, as it has at least prepared
him for SJT and will be used in a trial if no settlement occurs.
Besides, cases settle every day in spite of their full preparation
because the risks and costs of further litigation far outweigh the
costs of preparation already incurred." 8 Consequently,
the only real limitation placed on a court's power under Rule 16
appears to be when the court's action would adversely prejudice
a party's position or would compel counsel to adopt one line of
(S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd, 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988), considered Rule 16: "[I]t should be
remembered that these proceedings are nonbinding and, other than fostering the hope of
settlement, they have no effect on the merits or outcome of this case." Id. See infra note
120.
114. Again, compulsory attendance is ordered with an eye toward encouraging, but
not forcing, settlement.
[Tlhe exigencies of modern dockets demand the adoption of novel and imagina-
tive means lest the courts, inundated by a tidal wave of cases, fail in their duty
to provide a just and speedy disposition of every case. These means may take the
form of compulsory arbitration, summary jury trials, imposing reasonable limits
on trial time, or, as here, the relatively innocuous device of requiring a settle-
ment conference attended by the clients as well as the attorneys.
Of course, the court cannot require any party to settle a case, whether the
court thinks that party's position is reasonable or not, but it can require [par-
ties] to make reasonable efforts, including attending a settlement conference
with an open mind.
Lockhart v. Patel, 115 F.R.D. 44, 47 (E.D. Ky. 1987) (emphasis added) (footnotes omit-
ted). Similarly in In re LaMarre, 494 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1974), the court held that:
[W]e have no doubt that the District Judge had the right and the power to issue
an order to Mr. LaMarre to attend a pretrial session of the court and, on refusal,
to enforce said order by contempt proceedings . . . . It is, of course, clear that
on due process grounds, no judge can compel a settlement prior to trial on terms
which one or both parties find completely unacceptable.
Id. at 756. "We ought not to impair the power and authority of a Judge to conduct effi-
ciently a pretrial conference or a trial." Id. at 761 (Weick, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
115. See supra note 39.
116. W. BRAZIL, supra note 9, at 69.
117. Id.
118. Lambros, supra note 10, at 1367.
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trial strategy over another . . . .Neither of these two latter
considerations is present in the summary [jury] trial
procedure.'19
SJT does not prejudice a party's position and it does not require a
party to adopt one line of strategy over another because SJT does
not affect the final outcome of a case' 20 and parties may still ob-
tain a trial on the merits after SJT if they are unable to settle.
In addition to Rules 1 and 16, advocates find justification for
SJT in Rules 39 and 83 as well.' 2 ' Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 39(c) provides for the use of an advisory jury in cases not
triable to a jury as of right. 2 2 Therefore, SJT, consistent with
Rule 39(c), recognizes the importance of lay juror opinions in the
legal system.23
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 allows district courts to
make local rules not inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and "[iun all cases not provided for by rule, [such as
Strandell] the district courts may regulate their practice in any
manner not inconsistent with these rules."'' 2 4 Court practices, like
local rules, are inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure when they "bear upon the ultimate outcome of the litiga-
tion."' 25 A SJT does not affect the outcome of the merits, so it
does not violate Rule 83.126
Strandell is not the definitive answer to the question of
whether or not district court judges have the power to mandate
119. M. JACOUBOVITCH & C. MOORE, supra note 30, at 41 (citation omitted).
120. McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 46 (E.D. Ky. 1988) ("[i]n no way
is the summary jury trial 'outcome-determinative' "); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Gen-
eral Elec., 117 F.R.D. 597, 602 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (SJT has "no effect on the merits or
outcome of this case"), aff/d, 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir: 1988); Jones-Hailey v. Corporation of
TVA, 660 F. Supp. 551, 553 (E.D. Tenn. 1987) (SJT "neither limits or [sic] expands the
rights of the parties involved"); Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 817 (SJT "preserve[s] access
to the courts").
121. See Strandell v. Jackson County, 115 F.R.D. 333, 335 (S.D. ILL.), vacated, 838
F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987).
122. Id. at 335.
123. Id. The Rule 39(c) argument is not very persuasive in justifying the existence of
judicial power to mandate SJT. See Hume v. M&C Management, No. C87-3104 (N.D.
Ohio Feb. 15, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). Rather, it is yet more evidence
that the spirit of the Rules endorses the procedure.
124. FED. R. Civ. P. 83. For a more complete analysis of the local rule-making pro-
cedure and SJT, see infra notes 189-200 and accompanying text. The rule-making analysis
applies to cases like Strandell where SJT is not promulgated by local rule.
125. Levin & Golash, supra note 4, at 50 (quoting Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149,
164 n. 23 (1972)).
126. See supra notes 120 and 124.
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SJTs. In fact, the Strandell court stands alone. All courts address-
ing the issue since Strandell have held that district court judges
have the power to mandate SITs either as a matter of inherent
power or pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. Further Authority for Mandatory Summary Jury Trials
There is further authority supporting the use of mandatory
summary jury trials. The 1984 Judicial Conference of the United
States rejected the idea of strictly voluntary use of summary jury
trials.127 The Conference justified judicial discretion to impose
mandatory ADR on the basis of variations in local legal culture,
the needs of the parties, and the fact that ADR is new - so it is
still unclear which type is best in different situations. 2 8 Further,
the Conference announced that mandatory ADR is acceptable be-
cause attorneys may be reluctant to use a new procedure. 29 There
is evidence that if SJT was not mandatory, litigants might not ask
to use it or would refuse to use it.'30
SIT may be most effective where the parties do not want to
participate and are opposed to settlement.'' This supports its
mandatory use because parties who refuse to participate or con-
sider settlement might not voluntarily submit to a SIT. Judge
Thomas Lambros said that SJT is most "effective when settlement
seems impossible because of a client's unyielding attitude. The
procedure is a safe and inexpensive way to show a recalcitrant
client that his case is weak."'3 2 "I [Judge Lambros] have found
127. S. GOLDBERG, supra note 9, at 283; WARREN CONFERENCE, supra note 5, at 43.
128. WARREN CONFERENCE, supra note 5, at 118.
129. Id.
130. "[Jludges who make no effort to acquaint litigants with court-sponsored settle-
ment procedures rarely get requests for assistance." D. PROVINE, supra note 4, at 12. But
Henry and Lieberman suggest that lawyers seek and get help from judges in settling their
cases. J. HENRY & J. LIEBERMAN, THE MANAGER'S GUIDE TO RESOLVING LEGAL DISPUTES
113-19 (1985).
Compulsory arbitration rules have been justified on similar grounds. In New England
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. Pa. 1983), a local rule providing
for mandatory arbitration was held valid because "the goals of the arbitration program and
the authority of this Court would be seriously undermined if a defendant were permitted to
refuse to attend an arbitration hearing. ... Id. at 715.
131. Annual Judicial Conference - Second Circuit of the United States, 115 F.R.D.
349, 367 (1984) (remarks of Judge Lambros) [hereinafter Judicial Conference].
132. Id. at 368. In addition, "[s]ummary jury trials . . . do not require cooperative
or highly rational litigants. These procedures may be called for even if the parties are
vindictive, emotional, or obstinate, for the active participants in each procedure are the
lawyers, not their clients." D. PROVINE, supra note 6, at 86.
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where the lawyers kick and scream, that case lends itself more to
a summary jury trial than those cases where the lawyers come
arm and arm .... "133
Although no legislation has passed concerning SJTs,134 in Oc-
tober 1988, Congress passed the Court Reform and Access to Jus-
tice Act of 1988,15 authorizing the passage of local rules to allow
mandatory court-annexed arbitration3 6 in twenty federal district
courts.' 37 Congress' enactment of the five-year pilot program dem-
onstrates that they have recognized the need for alternatives to
litigation. However, not all cases are fit for mandatory arbitration.
Congress has indicated that cases regarding new issues or Consti-
tutional rights are inappropriate for mandatory arbitration under
the new law.'38 A similar view has been expressed with respect to
SJT.139
The import of this legislation is that Congress encourages
ADR experimentation by district courts,140 and that Congress
supports mandatory court-annexed procedures as alternatives
before a full trial on the merits. "
133. Judicial Conference, supra note 131, at 373 (remarks of Judge Lambros).
134. H.R. 3898, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) and S. 2027, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,
136 CONG. REC. S493-97 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1990) ("Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990")
recently were introduced in Congress requiring, as part of a judicial expense and delay
reduction plan, the availability and use of appropriate ADR techniques including SJT.
H.R. 473, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) ("Alternate Dispute Resolution Promotion Act of
1987") and S. 2038, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) ("Alternative Dispute Resolution Promo-
tion Act of 1986") (printed in full in Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judici-
ary on S.2038 and S.2046, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 292-98 (1986)) were introduced, but never
passed. They were intended "to encourage the use of alternatives to traditional litigation,
by requiring attorneys to advise their clients of the alternatives and permitting clients to
make offers engage in those alternative proceedings." Hearings before the Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary on S.2038 and S.2046, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1986) (statement of
Senator Mitch McConnell).
135. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4662 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-58 (Supp.
1989)).
136. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4659 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 651 (Supp.
1989)); H. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1988).
137. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4662 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 658 (Supp.
1989)); H. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1988).
138. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4659 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 652 (Supp.
1989)); H. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1988).
139. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
140. See H. R. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1988) ("it is no longer
feasible to use a single procedure, adjudication, for the myriad disputes of a complex
society").
141. This legislation "recognizes the importance of alternative methods of dispute
resolution, even those that are court-annexed." Id. at 33.
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3. Mandatory Summary Jury Trial Does Not Violate Pretrial
Discovery or the Work Product Doctrine
In Strandell, the court held that mandatory SJT intrudes on
pretrial discovery and the work product doctrine. The court found
that SJT radically alters the balance struck in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26 between the need for pretrial disclosure and
the interest of the parties in confidentiality. 42 The court implied
that mandatory SJT violates Rule 83 because the district court's
practice is inconsistent with Rule 26 and the work product doc-
trine. 143 Strandell is unclear as to whether this objection was di-
rected to the discovery of work product in the form of witness
statements, or the mental impressions, opinions, and theories of
the lawyer.144 The argument is that mandatory SJT is being used
as an ostensible discovery device 45  to expose both types of
materials. 6
Hickman v. Taylor 47 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(3) x48 are the basis of the work product doctrine, which pro-
142. See Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 1988); Maatman,
supra note 4, at 476.
143. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888.
144. 1 suspect that the Seventh Circuit was concerned about both. The court focuses,
however, on witness statements that were protected by the district court's denial of defend-
ants' motion to compel production. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77. SJT, argua-
bly, would expose this information, thus violating the work product protection. granted by
the district court.
145. Similarly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 may also be
susceptible to abuse as a discovery device all its own as litigants seek to discover
the factual basis for their opponents' claims in order to make a Rule I 1 motion.
However, the Advisory Committee addresses this problem of satellite litigation
by suggesting that Rule 11 proceedings be limited to the record, with discovery
allowed only in extraordinary circumstances.
Vairo, Rule ]I: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 196 (1988) (footnote omitted); see
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note on proposed amendment, 97 F.R.D. 165, 201
(1983).
146. It could also be argued that SJT allows early exposure of impeachment evi-
dence that normally would not be discoverable. Therefore, a lawyer will not know whether
to bring out impeaching evidence during SJT, or whether to reserve the impeaching evi-
dence so as not to diminish its impact in the event of a trial on the merits. Because SJT is
inappropriate in cases where credibility is an issue, the use of impeachment evidence in
SJT will likely not be a concern.
147. 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (creating the work product doctrine by declaring that wit-
ness statements collected in anticipation of litigation are protected from discovery).
148. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) states in part:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise dis-
coverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's
representative . . . only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has
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tects an attorney's work product from discovery unless a proper
showing of necessity is made by the requesting party. While the
work product doctrine does not prevent the discovery of facts, it
does protect an attorney's opinion work product, including written
and unwritten legal theories, opinions and mental impressions.149
Hickman states that witness statements should be discoverable
only in a "rare situation."'150 Rule 26 expanded the scope of opin-
ion work product, but "did not make clear whether such work
product was always immune from discovery, and if not, what stan-
dard should be applied to determine when discovery should be al-
lowed."' 151 Nevertheless, a greater showing of necessity is gener-
ally required to expose opinion work product.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33 diminishes the protection
of opinions by allowing interrogatories regarding "an opinion or
contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact."'52
The advisory committee note states that this kind of information
"can be most useful in narrowing and sharpening the issues, which
is a major purpose of discovery."' 53 Similarly, Rule 36 allows re-
quests for admissions "that relate to statements or opinions of fact
substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that
the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent
of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when
the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of
the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney
149. Keep in mind that
[t]hrough [other] discovery vehicles available under the Rules, the existence,
identity, location and material factual content of the document or thing may be
discovered. Only the production of the document or thing itself is protected
... . Further, protection of the production of any document intended as an
exhibit at trial disappears at a scheduling or pretrial conference under Rule 16
where the court normally orders an exchange of exhibits at a time prior to trial.
Smith, The Work Product Doctrine: Its Origin, Evolution and Status in Modern Practice,
33 S.D.L. REv. 224, 230 (1988) (emphasis added).
150. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 513.
[T]he Court found no showing of necessity sufficient to justify production of the
material in question; the plaintiffs counsel made clear that he sought the state-
ments only to ensure that he had fully prepared his case. The Court stressed that
the lawyer could have obtained the material from . . . other sources.
Note, The Work Product Doctrine in Subsequent Litigation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 412, 418
(1983) (footnotes omitted).
151. Note, supra note 150, at 420. In 1981, the Supreme Court said, "we are not
prepared at this juncture to say that [opinion work product] is always protected by the
work-product rule." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 401-02 (1981).
152. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(b).
153. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amended Rules, 48 F.R.D. 459, 524 (1970)
(citations omitted).
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or of the application of law to fact.' 54 Ultimately,
[s]uch a distinction [between fact and opinion] may not matter
in many cases because the. . . general practice of the courts to
order the exchange and submission of trial briefs in advance of
trial seems to effectively cause disclosure of any purely legal
opinions which have any relevance to the issues involved.' 55
Since the development of ADR is relatively recent, "the law
is only now beginning to catch up.' 1 56 Two district courts have
commented on and disagreed with the Strandell work product
doctrine argument. Judge Bertelsman of the Eastern District of
Kentucky said:
The concern of the Seventh Circuit [in Strandell] with violation
of . . .protection of work product . . . seems misplaced. Mod-
ern federal courts require a comprehensive pretrial order, ex-
change of witness lists and summaries of anticipated testimony,
and the listing and marking of all exhibits. Because a summary
jury trial is based on facts disclosed by discovery and is to be a
synopsis of the actual trial, it is hard to see how anything would
be disclosed by a summary jury trial that would not be disclosed
at the real trial and would not already be contained in the pre-
trial order, which is also an overview of the real trial. If the
Seventh Circuit means that a summary jury trial prevents a liti-
gant from saving some juicy tidbit as a surprise for the trial a la
Perry Mason, the pretrial orders used by most courts are sup-
posed to do the same thing. Trial by ambush has long since been
eliminated from the federal system.157
Magistrate Janice M. Symchych of the District Court of Minne-
sota made a similar comment. 158 As further support, the implica-
tion from a recent Sixth Circuit decision that considered the im-
pact of post-SJT discovery is that either the court thought
154. FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a).
155. Smith, supra note 149, at 232 (emphasis added). Indeed, in Harvey v, Eimco
Corp., 33 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Pa. 1963), the court held that "[tihe plaintiff cannot subvert
the clear intent of the pretrial rules by withholding his theory of liability under the cloister
of privilege." Id. at 361.
156. Dauer, Confidentiality in ADR, in CONTAINING LEGAL COSTS 18 (1988) (foot-
note omitted).
157. McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 48 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
158. Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 606 (D. Minn.
1988). Magistrate Symchych explained that:
Because of the extensive pretrial procedures involved in preparing litigation in
Federal courts and because a SJT is based on facts disclosed by discovery and is
to be a synopsis of the actual trial, it is difficult to believe that anything would
be disclosed at a SJT that would not ultimately be disclosed at the actual trial.
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discovery after SJT was an acceptable practice or that they simply
were not concerned about it.159
The theory behind the work product doctrine is that it pro-
tects the trial process by reducing lawyers' incentives to be less
than fully prepared for trial, or to hide or misplace materials. 6 '
The doctrine protects the adversary system by protecting the law-
yer's work.' 6 ' Hickman also encompasses the idea that the lawyer
has an economic interest in his work and "should not be required
to sacrifice the 'fruits of [his] labor.' "a162
Essentially, advocates fear that without work product protec-
tion parties will not do their own preparation, either because "they
might eventually have to turn their work product over to the other
side,1'1 3 or because they know that they can obtain the informa-
tion from the other side.6 Professor Kathleen Waits suggests that
159. Compressed Gas Corp. v. U.S. Steel, 857 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. de-
nied, 109 S. Ct. 1641 (1989). The case was tried as a SJT in February, 1985. After SJT, a
settlement could not be reached, so the case was reassigned to a district court judge who
allowed further discovery. A full trial on the merits followed in October, 1986, and the
verdict was for the plaintiffs. The district court denied defendants' motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and new trial. Defendants' appeal to the Sixth Circuit included
a claim that the district court "abused its discretion in allowing [plaintiffs] to conduct
additional discovery following [the SJT]." Id. at 348. The Sixth Circuit reversed and re-
manded on two other issues, but affirmed the discovery issue as they were unable to con-
clude that it constituted reversible error. Id. at 354.
160. Note, supra note 150, at 425-27. One of Hickman's "major purposes ... was
to safeguard those aspects of the attorney's role most necessary to the integrity of the trial
process." Id. at 425. But see Waits, Work Product Protection for Witness Statements:
Time for Abolition, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 305. The work product doctrine protects both data
collection and interpretation. The adversarial system, however, depends on competitive in-
terpretation, not competitive collection. Id. at 338-39. The evolving federal rules have gen-
erally emphasized liberal information exchange. Repeal of the work product doctrine with
regard to witness statements would be consistent with the goals of the rules. Id. at 344-45.
161. Note, supra note 150, at 428-29. "[T]he only aspect that keeps the trial adver-
sarial is each side's strategy and thoughts." Id. (footnote omitted).
162. Id. at 430 (citing United States v. Swift & Co., 24 F.R.D. 280, 284 (N.D. Il1.
1959) (ordering discovery)). This was plaintiffs' primary work product argument in
Strandell. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91. While this argument generally is
characterized as a proprietary one, it also can be characterized as an argument dealing
with notions of fairness.
163. Waits, supra note 160, at 327-28.
164. Professor Waits acknowledges that many people believe this but she points to
other incentives for diligent investigation:
Hickman's supporters seem to think that lawyers will be lazy unless the rules
force them to be diligent. They further suppose that individuals will be produc-
tive only if they are given exclusive dominion over the goods produced. Their
theories thus ignore the possibility that other incentives to full investigation and
fair recording might exist even if work product had to be shared. Finally, work
product apologists overlook resource imbalances and therefore equate diligence
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nevertheless, there are strong incentives to prepare fully because
"it is too dangerous to rely on an opponent's diligence. . .[or] on
an opponent's laziness." '65 In order to achieve justice, the adver-
sary system arguably requires a determination of the truth which,
in turn, requires the discovery and evaluation of relevant informa-
tion. 16 Therefore, discovering information is only half the battle,
as the attorney must do the evaluation for himself.
Theorists will argue that . . . if in fact there are two legitimate
sides to a dispute the sharing of information concerning it in
advance of its actual resolution should not diminish the effec-
tiveness of the presentation of the positions of the adversaries.
The argument continues . . . that the ultimate decision with re-
spect to the disputes should not be influenced by or actually turn
on a 'cat and mouse' approach with its last minute surprises. It
is hard to argue against that position .... 167
The proprietary interest rationalization of the work product
doctrine has been extensively criticized.
It has been suggested that the Hickman decision was a "rough
political judgment," calculated to gain acceptance of the then
new discovery rules by the bar. Thus, the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Hickman may have been intended in part to placate at-
torneys' sense of proprietary interest in their work product.
...Attorneys, as officers of the court, are in many situa-
tions forced to subordinate their own self-interest or proprietary
interest to that of the judicial system.' 68
The work product doctrine assumes that an attorney will not pre-
pare if he is unable to control the fruits of his labor.6 9 In fact,
with productivity. They conclude that rewarding productivity is fair because
they assume that anyone who will produce, can produce.
Id. at 328 (footnotes omitted).
If in fact the work product doctrine does not deter naturally lazy attorneys from being
lazy, then hard-working attorneys who need work product are penalized by a rule that is
ineffective, as are clients and the justice system generally. Id. at 329 n.122.
165. Id. at 332.
166. Id. at 338. I recognize that any "truth-finding" function of the adversary sys-
tem is frustrated by other concerns such as those exemplified in the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
167. Smith, supra note 149, at 235.
168. Comment, The Potential for Discovery of Opinion Work Product under Rule
26(b)(3), 64 IowA L. REv. 103, 115 (1978) (footnotes omitted). The work product doctrine
reflects and perpetuates lawyers' self-interest because lawyers must litigate conflicts over
work product, and lawyers must duplicate each other's work. Waits, supra note 160, at
340-41.
169. Waits, supra note 160, at 331.
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"[b]ecause preparation increases the chances of a favorable out-
come, it is its own reward." '1 0
The goals of the work product doctrine must be balanced
with the opposing goals of.the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were specifically designed to prevent surprise during trial. 1 1 The
amendments liberalized discovery and the pretrial process in order
to simplify and narrow issues, crystalize remaining claims and de-
fenses, and eliminate uncontroverted issues and surprise that could
delay the trial.'72 The purposes of open discovery include all of the
above, as well as setting a climate that increases the possibility of
settlement, and disclosing "fully the nature and scope of the con-
troversy."1 '' In response to the "sporting theory of justice," the
Advisory Committee hoped to end the "fortuitous availability of
evidence or [dependency on] the skill and strategy of counsel,"' 4
and to start focusing on the merits. Inherent in this argument is a
sense that during all stages of litigation we are dealing with jus-
tice and not playing games;175 if a litigant thinks he has a strong
case, he should lay his cards on the table and let justice be
done."'76
170. Id.
171. 10 Fed. Proc. § 26:1, at 247-48 (T. Travers m. ed., R. Davis, W. Foster, J.
Smith, D. Ytreberg eds. 1988). The amendments were designed to prevent surprise regard-
ing facts, not opinions.
172. P. EBENER, COURT EFFORTS TO REDUCE PRETRIAL DELAY 69 (1981).
173. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §
2001 (1970) (footnote omitted).
174. Id. at 19 (citing Teller v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 27 F. Supp. 938, 941
(E.D. Pa. 1939) (The court is moving closer to "the day when the outcome of. . . litiga-
tion will depend less upon the skill and 'strategic maneuvering of respective counsel and
more upon the merits of the issues involved.")).
175. "Modern instruments of discovery serve a useful purpose . . . . They together
with pretrial procedures make a trial less a game of blind man's bluff and more a fair
contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practical extent." United
States v. Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 682-83 (1958). Rule 16 goes hand in hand with
Rule 26 - "Rule 16 provides an important mechanism for carrying out one of the basic
policies of the federal rules -the determination of disputes on their merits rather than on
the basis of procedural niceties or tactical advantage." 6A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 108, § 1522 at 219 (emphasis added).
176. When an attorney refuses to submit to SJT, he may be trying to conceal his
weak case or his lack of confidence in the case. If he is fully prepared and thinks his case is
strong, he will not hesitate to submit it to a settlement process like SJT. Brazil makes this
argument in considering submitting a case to a judicially hosted settlement conference:
It is a sign of strength, not weakness, to want to have a judge at a settlement
conference frankly assess the merits of each side's position. A lawyer who sug-
gests a judicially hosted settlement conference is saying, in effect, "I want an
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The work product doctrine is not an inflexible rule, but a
counterweight to the trial process.
In each instance when the protection of the work product doc-
trine is sought, the benefits of protection must be weighed
against the advantages to the trial of releasing the material. The
protection that an attorney's work product receives can always
be pierced to further the trial process. It is its role in the overall
trial process that keeps work product inviolate, not some aspect
of the material itself.177
Furthermore, the application of the work product doctrine is
within the discretion of the court, 78 and judicial necessity is good
cause to expose otherwise protected information. Finally, it may
be argued that because SJT is ADR and not adjudication, the
work product doctrine should not apply or at least should be com-
promised to allow SJT to happen.
To protect litigants, the judge can set an immediate trial date
to prevent the opposition from using ostensible discovery disclosed
during SJT. The judge can further protect litigants by disallowing
additional formal discovery after the SJT. 1 9
The judge also can follow standard pretrial conference proce-
dures to protect litigants from the effects of SJT on a future trial.
The presumption in a pretrial conference is that after discovery is
complete, lawyers know of almost all evidence relating to their
case. Accordingly, "it would not be unreasonable to hold them to
the statements they make and the agreements they enter into at
the conference or restrict their proof at trial to the issues set forth
independent judgment about this matter because I believe that such a judgment
will do more for my client than for yours." That lawyer also is saying that he
knows his case well enough to cast it into a process he cannot fully control, and
that he is prepared to live with the consequences.
W. BRAZIL, supra note 9, at 94-95.
In the situation where one party has a considerably stronger case and there is, for all
practical purposes, no genuine dispute, the advocate with the stronger case may not want to
disclose further information at a SJT because it may be used by the other advocate to
supplement a weak case in order to obtain a more favorable settlement. SJT should be used
only in cases where a genuine dispute exists. The above-described situation should be re-
solved by summary judgment and not by SJT.
177. Note, supra note 150, at 431.
178. See Dauer, supra note 156, at 12. "Trial courts have considerable discretion in
the application of Rule 26." Id.
179. See Lambros, supra note 10, at 1376. But see Compressed Gas Corp. v. U.S.
Steel, 857 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1988) (affirming allowance of additional discovery after a
SJT).
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in the pretrial order."' 80 In practical terms, because SJT is typi-
cally ordered long after discovery is completed, in cases where set-
tlement cannot be reached at the final pretrial conference, 18' the
conference could still fulfill the purpose a final pretrial conference
by limiting parties in a later trial on the merits to issues, evidence,
witnesses listed, and other pretrial matters.8 2 This would give
some protection to counsels' opinions, theories, and arguments
without resorting to the work product doctrine.
With these further protections, there is nothing unfair about
SJTs, and they have the benefit of increasing the efficiency of the
judicial system.'8 3 In response to Strandell, mandatory SJT is
consistent with Rule 26(b)(3), and does not intrude on pretrial
discovery and the work product doctrine.
D. Reasons for the Strandell Outcome
1. Strandell May Have Been an Inappropriate Case for a
Summary Jury Trial
Because the decision to mandate a SJT is within the discre-
tion of the district court, the Strandell outcome might have been a
result of using SJT in a case in which SJT was inappropriate. SJT
is inappropriate for cases in which the credibility of the witnesses
is an important issue, 1 4 and credibility was an important issue in
180. 6A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 108, § 1527 at 600. "[A]n attempt to
pursue any issue not listed in the order may be rejected by the trial court." Id., § 1527 at
600 (footnote omitted).
181. Lambros, supra note 10, at 1376.
182. One federal district court clarified the purpose of final pretrial conferences and
orders when SJTs are used.
[M]ovants . . . also attach some importance to the fact that the "final pretrial
conference" has occurred in this case. First, we consider the summary jury trial
to be a pretrial proceeding; we recognize that it is not a "conference" in the
traditional sense. Second, we want to dispel what appears to be movants' misun-
derstanding that the final pretrial conference in this case relates to the summary
jury trial. The final pretrial conference in this case, as in all cases, relates to the
trial on the merits. The summary jury trial is the final settlement technique
undertaken by the Court before trial on the merits. The final pretrial conference
and the final pretrial order resulting therefrom delineate the issues of fact and
law that must be resolved in the litigation.
Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec., 117 F.R.D. 597, 601-02 (S.D. Ohio 1987),
affd 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988).
183. See Lambros, supra note 10, at 1378 (noting the efficiency of ADR methods
when integrated with the existing pre-trial and trial process).
184. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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Strandell.'85 SJT also is inappropriate in actions against the gov-
ernment.1 86 The fact that Strandell was a civil rights action
against Jackson County, Illinois, is another factor that made the
case inappropriate for SJT. For these reasons the Seventh Circuit
should have found that Strandell was inappropriate for SJT, and
for that reason the litigants should not have been compelled to
participate.
Even if Strandell was inappropriate for SJT, plaintiffs' coun-
sel was properly held in contempt for refusing to obey the court's
order to compel a SJT.187 Plaintiffs' remedy was to appeal the dis-
trict court's order after the trial on the merits for abuse of discre-
tion because orders made pursuant to Rule 16 are interlocutory
and not appealable until a final determination on the merits.' 8"
The Seventh Circuit then might have found that the district court
had abused its discretion because Strandell was inappropriate for
mandatory SJT.
2. The Local Rules Did Not Provide for Summary Jury Trial
The fact that local rules did not formally provide for a SJT
makes the Strandell outcome somewhat more justifiable. District
courts can "prescribe rules for the conduct of their business" con-
sistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' 89 In addition,
185. "The plaintiffs and defendants differed greatly on what actually happened to
Strandell after he was arrested on a charge of disorderly conduct." Marcotte, No Forced
Summary Jury Trials: Trial Judge Can't Order Parties to Try Settlement, A.B.A. J., Apr.
1, 1988, at 32.
186. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
187. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16(f) provides in part: "[i]f a party or party's
attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order . . . the judge . . . may make such
orders with regard thereto as are just, and among others any of the orders provided in Rule
37(b) (2)(B),(C),(D)."
Among other things, Rule 37(b)(2) allows the judge to treat the failure to obey a
court order as contempt. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
188. See 6A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 108, § 1526 at 259 ("There can
be no direct appeal from a pretrial order becuase it is not final and may be modified at a
later stage in the proceedings."). Perhaps a party could likewise appeal a judicial decision
not to compel a SJT, especially where SJT is regularly used or is ordered by a local rule.
This is a difficult remedy for litigants because they will need to participate in the SJT
before appealing the district court's order compelling participation. Perhaps in extreme
circumstances a writ of mandamus would be an appropriate means of appeal. Furthermore,
because I have concluded that district court judges do have the power to mandate SJTs,
litigants will be able to challenge only the appropriateness of SJT on a case-by-case basis
by claiming on abuse of discretion by the trial judge. See Comment, Compelled Participa-
tion in Summary Jury Trials: A Tale of Two Cases, 77 Ky. L.J. 421, 438-39 (1988-89).
189. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982).
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district courts can follow these rules even if they are not formally
written. 9 '
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 and 28 U.S.C. § 2071 go
hand-in-hand.' 9' Rule 83 allows district courts to make local rules
not inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
"[i]n all cases not provided for by rule, the district judges and
magistrates may regulate their practice in any manner not incon-
sistent with these rules." 192 Inconsistency between a local rule and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure under Rule 83 must either
be express or "bear upon. the ultimate outcome of the litiga-
tion." I9 Under Rule 83, the public must be notified of proposed
local rules and given an opportunity to comment on them. 94
Local rules designed to conserve court resources have been
held not to violate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 195 1 ike-
wise, local rules providing for compulsory arbitration have been
held not inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'96
Therefore, local rules providing for mandatory SJT in order to
reduce court delay are not inconsistent with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure as well.' 91 Such a rule is not expressly inconsis-
190. See Duncan's Heirs v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 535, 540 (1833) ("It is
not essential that any court, in establishing or changing its practice, should do so by the
adoption of written rules. Its practice may be established by a uniform mode of proceeding
for a series of years, and this forms the law of the court.").
191. Levin and Golash, supra note 4, at 49.
192. FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
193. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 164 n.23 (1973) (upholding the use of a six-
person jury in civil cases). A local rule is inconsistent if it is expressly inconsistent, or it is a
"basic procedural innovation," meaning that if a local innovation is "so radically different
from past practice as to be considered 'basic,' [it is] inappropriate for local rule making."
Levin and Golash, supra note 4, at 50 (footnote omitted). A local rule is a "basic proce-
dural innovation" if it "bear[s] upon the ultimate outcome of the litigation." Colgrove, 413
U.S. at 164 n.23.
194. FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
195. In United States v. Reaves, 636 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (E.D. Ky. 1986), the court
held that placing reasonable time limits on a trial to spare court resources was within the
court's rule-making power, and its inherent power to control its docket. Similarly, in White
v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 783 F.2d 1175, 1178 (4th Cir. 1986), the court held that a
local rule imposing costs on parties refusing to settle until the day of trial was within the
court's power.
196. See New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F. Supp. 712, 714
(E.D. Pa. 1983); Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 574 (E.D. Pa. 1979);
Davison v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, 462 F. Supp. 778 (D. Md. 1978), al' d, 617 F.2d 361,
362 (4th Cir. 1980). Similarly, in Rhea v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 767 F.2d 266, 268 (6th
Cir. 1985), the court upheld a rule authorizing district judges to refer cases to mandatory
mediation, even where it imposed extra costs.
197. McKay v. Ashland Oil, 120 F.R.D. 43, 46 (E.D. Ky. 1988). "Under the stan-
dards laid down by the Supreme Court, it is highly unlikely that any federal ADR program
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tent, and it does not bear on the outcome of litigation. 98
A formal local rule is scrutinized by the public who are given
an opportunity to express their opinions as to its desirability. A
rule also puts litigants and their attorneys on notice that a SJT
may be required.' 99 Mandating SJT by a formal local rule is a
more equitable procedure20 0 than that evidenced in Strandell and
consequently, litigants may be more amenable to participating in
mandatory SJT. The fact that the district court had not promul-
gated a local rule mandating SJT may also have contributed to
the Seventh Circuit's outcome in Strandell.
CONCLUSION
There is no reason to limit judicial discretion to mandate the
use of SJT. SJT does not affect the outcome of the merits or oth-
erwise compromise litigants' substantive rights. Judges who use
SJT rave of its success in settling cases and reducing delay. Fur-
ther, federal district court judges have the power and discretion to
mandate SJT as a matter of their inherent power to control the
docket, and pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
use of the SJT should be encouraged in appropriate cases.
ANNE C. MORGAN
would fail for inconsistency with the national rules." Levin and Golash, supra note 4, at 51
(footnote omitted).
198. See supra text accompanying note 119.
199. In Strandell, the district court used SJT in the past, which arguably provided
some form of notice to the litigants. Strandell v. Jackson County, 115 F.R.D. 333, 334
(S.D. 111.), vacated, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987).
200. United States District Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the Eastern District of New
York, who is uncertain about compelling parties to participate in ADR procedures, agrees:
"If compulsion is to be used, it at least ought to be authorized by adoption of a formal
local rule, so that the matter can be debated publicly and the full district court and the
Circuit Council can pass on it." J. Weinstein, Judges and Alternative Dispute Resolution,
presented to American Bar Association Session on Judicial Power and ADR, Toronto, Ca-
nada, August 9, 1988, at 8 (citation omitted). But cf. McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 49. "This
court holds that participation in summary jury trials may be mandated by trial courts in
their discretion even aside from the existence of a local rule." Id.
1989-901

